A criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999, in a conversion test facility at the JCO Tokai site. The accident was triggered by pouring an 18.8% enriched uranyl nitrate solution into a precipitation vessel beyond the critical mass. The accident continued for about 19 hours before the criticality could be stopped, during which time neutrons and gamma-rays were emitted continuously due to fission reactions. The total number of fission reactions was 2.5 × 10 18 , which was estimated by an activity analysis of the fission products in the solution of the precipitation vessel.
INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident occurred at a uranium fuel conversion test facility of JCO Co.,Ltd. Tokai-mura, Japan. The Tokai-mura site is located about 135 km northeast of Tokyo in Ibaraki-prefecture, as shown in Fig.1 . JCO has operated mainly conversion facilities to produce uranium oxide powder or uranyl nitrate solution from low enriched uranium hexafluoride of less than 5% for PWR and BWR power reactors, and occasionally 18.8% enriched uranyl nitrate solution in a conversion test facility for an experimental fast breeding reactor, JOYO. The criticality accident was triggered by pouring a sufficient amount of the 18.8% enriched uranium solution into a precipitation vessel, causing a prompt criticality reaction, and was terminated after approximately 19 hours by draining the cooling water around the vessel, which acted as a neutron reflector to maintain the criticality condition. The total number of fis- sion reactions during the 19 hours was about 2.5 × 10 18 , which was estimated by an activity analysis of the fission products in the solution of the precipitation vessel. Consequently, this accident gave serious radiation doses to 3 employees and fatal doses to 2 of them; further, neutrons and gamma-rays emitted by the accident caused doses to many residents, JCO employees, and emergency personnel who attempted to terminate the criticality and to rescue the 3 employees. The dominant dose for the residents and the JCO employees was caused by neutrons and gamma-rays produced in the precipitation vessel. The individual dose was estimated for 234 residents, 169 JCO employees and 260 emergency personnel, respectively. In this paper, the accident description, emergency actions, and dose assessment are summarized.
FEATURES OF ACCIDENT

Emergency actions
After the accident had occurred at 10:35 a.m., the gamma-ray dose rates in the JCO site remained at a fairy high level, even after a few hours, although neutron-dose measurements were not made at that time. Therefore, about 200 residents were recommended to evacuate from the area within a 350 m radius of the conversion facility at 3:00 p.m. by the Tokai-mura administration. In addition, those residents within 10 km were recommended to remain in their houses at 10:30 p.m. by the Ibraki -prefecture administration based on the behavior of environmental monitors. On the other hand, comprehensive environmental neutron and gamma-ray monitoring was carried out after 5:00 p.m., which showed approximately a one-order higher dose than gammaray doses from the vicinity up to 800 m, as shown in Fig. 2 . The neutron doses at around 7:00 p.m. were about 4 mSv to 4.5mSv at the site boundary of JCO, which is about 60m-70m from the conversion facility.
Based on very poor information, computer calculations were performed concerning the excess criticality by the JAERI scientists; the calculated results suggested that removal of the water in the cooling jacket surrounding the precipitation vessel might terminate the criticality state. A series of designed actions to remove the cooling water was, therefore, initiated at midnight of September 30 by JCO employees with the help of JAERI and JNC staff. The cooling pump and the cooling tower for the cooling water were located outside of the building of the conversion facility. However, a preliminary survey indicated that the neutron-dose rate at the cooling tower might be higher than a few Sv/h. Therefore, all of the actions were planned such as not to exceed 100mSv given as an allowable level in emergencies by the radiological protection regulation of Japan. The initiative to remove the cooling water started at 2:30 a.m. on October 1 after cautious preparations for the procedure of each action, the tool for the action, personnel monitoring, etc., and was successfully terminated the criticality state by purging the cooling water with argon gas connected to the cooling water pipe broken at around 6:15 a.m. After that, a boric acid solution(about 17 liters) was injected into the precipitation vessel at 8:30 a.m. so as not to make a criticality state again. 18 persons were engaged in the subsequent drainage work of water, and 6 persons in the work of pouring boric acid into the precipitation tank.
Radiation monitoring
The radiation monitors of companies and laboratories, which have been installed widely in the Tokai-mura and neighboring towns, detected radiations and radioactive materials released from the building of the conversion facility. Neutron and gamma-ray monitors located about 1.7 km and 2 km distance from the JCO site, which had been prepared to monitor the radiation from d-D fusion experiments at the Naka Establishment of JAERI, accidentally recorded the radiation emitted over the criticality accident, as shown in Fig. 3 . The records of the neutron monitor directly represented the trend of the fission reactions which originated from the accident, while gamma-ray monitors detected several gamma-ray peaks which originated from noble gases such as Kr and Xe released from the building and carried by the wind. Besides, a gamma-ray area monitor in the main conversion facility of the JCO about 140 m distance from the precipitation vessel caught the detailed trend of the criticality accident. Figure 4 is a pattern of the criticality state obtained from the record of the gamma-ray area monitor of JCO. The pattern can be divided into two regions, designated by the BURST and PLATEAU, where the BURST from the beginning to about 11:00 a.m. represents a region where the fission rate was rapidly changing after the prompt criticality; PLATEAU is that after 11:00 a.m., where the fission rate slowly decreased.
Estimation of total fission
The total number of fissions over the criticality accident estimated using the data by analyzing the concentrations of non-volatile fission products in the solution sampled from the precipitation vessel on 20 October, 1999. The total fission evaluated from the analysis of four nuclides; 99 Ni(n,p) 58 Co reactions in the stainless-steel net on the cooling tower gave a total fission of 2.4 × 10 18 , quite consistent with that from fission products. The value of 2.5 × 10 18 fissions corresponds to the third in quantity among 21 criticality accidents which have occurred at fuel facilities around the world. 
DOSE ASSESSMENT
Monitoring data
As shown in Fig. 2 , the neutron and gamma-ray dose rates have been measured extensively in the neighboring area of the JCO site. Figure 2 shows the dose-equivalent rates of neutron and gamma-rays measured by the JAERI survey group with Anderson-Braun rem counters and ionization chambers, of which the detector responses have been calibrated. Using these data, the fitting parameters of Stevenson's formula, representing the relation between the dose rate and the distance from a quasi-point isotropic source were determined using a least-squares method for neutrons and gamma-rays, as follows: 
where H n and H γ are the dose-equivalent rate for neutrons and gamma-rays, respectively, and r is the distance from the tank. Equations (1) and (2) were used to obtain the ambient dose-equivalent rate after 11:00 a.m. on September 30, of which the region is specified as PLATEAU.
On the other hand, there is no measured data in a region before 11:00 a .m., specified as BURST. Hence, an assumption was made such that the ratio of the total ambient dose equivalent in the PLATEAU and BURST regions is proportional to the total fission in each region, and that the neutron dose rate,MP1, shown in Fig. 3 is proportional to the fission rate. The neutron-dose rate in Fig. 3 was converted from the counting rate of a He-3 proportional counter with a polyethylene moderator; fortunately, the counting data per second were recorded in a computer memory. Subsequently, the data was processed statistically to determine the ratio between the PLATEAU and BURST to be (89 ± 2):(11 ± 2).
Individual dose for public
The ambient dose equivalent values measured with neutron and gamma-ray survey meters were converted to effective dose-equivalent values using the energy spectra of neutrons and gamma-rays calculated with a one-dimensional transport code, ANISN, where the Anterior-Posterior geometry (AP) was assumed to give the maximum dose.
The accumulated effective doses in PLATEAU were calculated for specific times and distances by integrating the spatial dose over the time trend shown in Fig. 4 , and those in the BURST by multiplying those of PLATEAU by ratio of 11:89. Table 2 gives the accumulated effective dose equivalents for the specified time and distance in which the contribution of gamma-rays are given in parentheses.
The accumulated dose in Table 2 represent the maximum value when a person outside keeps a standing position facing the JCO site. The behavior and shielding effects by houses, however, were taken account for determining the individual dose for each resident within 350m. Consequently, the maximum dose was 21mSv and the doses were less than 5mSv for most people. Besides, the doses for 7 other people were estimated from the activity of 24 Na measured using a whole-body counter; the maximum dose among them was 16mSv.
Individual doses for workers 172 employees were working on the site, including the 3 seriously exposed workers, in which 24 persons were engaged in water-draining work to stop the criticality state. 234 persons of JAERI, JNC, the government, and other organizations were engaged in various types of work, in which 3 fire fighters were included, who attended the rescue of the 3 heavily exposed workers.
The individual doses of the workers was assessed using several methods, such as personal dosimeters, 24 Na acitivity with a whole-body counter, and an estimation based on the behavior of each person, as was the case for the public. The maximum dose among the employee was 48 mSv, and that among the other workers was 9.4 mSv.
Dose for 3 workers
Dose estimations for 3 workers were made using lymphocyte counts, a chromosome aberration counting method, an analysis of the 24 Na activity in the blood and whole-body counting of 24 Na by the NIRS team. The estimated dose for each worker was 16 to 20 and more, 6 to 10, and 1 to 4.5 GyEq, respectively. Actually, a great difference of the dose distribution was observed in the body of a worker. The details of the dose distribution and individual organ dose have been estimated using a computer simulation of the working condition when the 2 workers were engaged in the job of interest.
SUMMARY
The results of the dose for all persons involved in the accident are summarized in Table 3 . Except for the 3 workers, no person has received a dose of more than 50 mSv. The details of the accident has been investigated by the Criticality Accident Investigation Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan.
1) Moreover, the Health Management Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission 2) has presented recommendations for health concerns based on the results of the radiation dose assessments. Detected by whole-body counters, individual dosimeters, etc.
JCO employees, etc.
The doses ranged 3.8 -48 mSv.
(172) Employees involved in injection of boric acid into the tank 6 Detected by dosimeters, etc. The doses ranged 0.7 -3.5 mSv.
49
Detected by whole-body counters and film dosimeters.
Other employees on the site during the accident The doses ranged 0.1 -9.2 mSv.
Persons involved in Fire fighters involved in rescue task 3
Detected by whole-body counters.
Their doses ranged 4.6 -9.4 mSv.
emergency response Employees of local government 167
Estimated by the behavior survey.
The doses ranged 0.0002 -7.2 mSv. Persons who passed by the site during the accident 28
Estimated by the behavior survey. The doses ranged 0.01 -3.8 mSv.
*1: The doses were estimated in terms of the effective dose equivalent except for the three workers heavily exposed around the tank.
*2: The doses were evaluated in terms of the gamma equivalent dose based on analysis of Sodium-24 (Na-24) in blood, chromosomal analysis, whole-body counting of Sodium-24 and lymphocyte counts.
